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Abstract:	   Europe	  has	  put	   in	  place	  a	  new	  system	  of	   complex	   fiscal	   rules.	   These	   include	  
the	   so-­‐called	   “six	   pack”	   to	   upgrade	   the	   Stability	   and	   Growth	   Pact	   and	   a	   new	   Treaty	  
incorporating	  the	  “fiscal	  compact”.	  Much	  of	  the	  discussion	  about	  the	  new	  rules	  has	  been	  
procedural	  or	  theoretical.	  This	  paper	  shows	  what	  the	  rules	  will	  mean	  in	  practice	  under	  a	  
medium-­‐term	   scenario	   developed	  by	   the	  OECD.	   So	   far,	   fiscal	   consolidation	  has	   largely	  
been	   driven	   by	   the	   recent	   wave	   of	   Excessive	   Deficit	   Procedures.	   Only	   once	   these	  
commitments	   have	   been	   fulfilled	   will	   the	   new	   system	   of	   rules	   come	   into	   action.	   Its	  
central	  pillar	  will	  be	   the	  requirement	   to	  balance	  budgets	   in	  structural	   terms.	  The	  rules	  
imply	   a	   tight	   fiscal	   stance	   over	   the	   coming	   years	   for	   many	   European	   countries	   by	  
historical	   standards.	   Almost	   all	   countries	   will	   have	   to	   be	   as	   disciplined	   as	   the	   few	  
countries	  that	  managed	  to	  make	  meaningful	  progress	  in	  tackling	  high	  debt	  levels	  in	  the	  
past.	  Over	   the	   very	   long	   term,	   the	   rules	   imply	  extremely	   low	   levels	  of	  debt.	   Thus,	   the	  
requirements	   are	   not	   likely	   to	   be	   permanent.	   The	   methodology	   to	   calculate	   the	  
structural	   balance	   has	   a	   number	   of	   weaknesses	   and	   discretion	   will	   be	   needed	   in	  
implementing	  the	  rules.	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1 Introduction 
The sharp deterioration in the public finances in Europe since the 
financial crisis erupted, combined with a preceding build-up in the 
debt-to-GDP ratio in many countries, has left the public finances in poor 
shape. This led to a substantial and necessary upgrading of EU fiscal 
institutions, notably aimed at dealing with the risks of moral hazard 
within the euro area. The main elements of these reforms are a 
strengthening of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) around the so-called 
“six pack” of legislative measures and a new inter-governmental treaty 
incorporating the “fiscal compact”. The latter requires that there must be a 
rule in national law that the budget position shall converge to a broadly 
balanced or surplus position in structural terms1. 
Much of the discussion about the new rules has been procedural or 
theoretical, focusing primarily on the identification of fiscal effort and 
shortcomings of using the structural balance (e.g. ECB, 2014; Hers and 
Suyker, 2014; Tereanu et al., 2014). The debate has been further obscured 
by the complexity of the system based on multiple fiscal rules, and their 
different effects on debt dynamics in the short and long term2. The most 
comprehensive analysis of the rules so far has been done by Eyraud and 
Wu (2015). They focused on assessing the past performance of the rules 
and suggested improvements, but they did not concentrate on 
medium-term fiscal implications of the rules. In this context, this paper 
investigates practical relevance of the rules and their implications for fiscal 
stance under a medium-term scenario developed by the OECD. 
The presented analysis shows that, in the near term, the post-crisis fiscal 
consolidation would largely be guided by the existing Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP) and the rules would only require modest incremental 
improvements in the underlying budget balances. However, the fiscal 
stance will have to be restrictive for a long time. What the rules imply for 
the budget balances is not out of line with what some countries have 
managed to achieve. However, some countries will have to show much 
greater discipline than in the past. Balanced budget commitments in 
structural terms would likely be central to the new regime. The revision of 
the Medium-Term Objectives (MTOs) for the budget balance will need to 
ensure that the required policies are realistic and sensible. The 
methodology for measuring the cyclically-adjusted budget balance has 
serious weaknesses and its implications will need to be carefully assessed. 
The complexity of the rules reduces transparency and could jeopardize the 
buy-in at national level. It could have been reduced by not introducing the 
debt convergence rule. According to simulations, this rule is not likely to 
                                                
1 A structural deficit of up to 0.5% of GDP is allowed for all participating countries, 
with up to 1% deficit for countries with government debt below 60% of GDP. 
2  For instance, while a broadly balanced structural budget stabilizes the debt-to-GDP 
ratio at a low level in the long term (Figure 2), in the short term, it can raise debt if 
headline budget is in deficit due to a negative output gap. Moreover, fiscal 
consolidation may increase debt initially if fiscal multipliers are large. 
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bind. In the long run, the implied steady-state debt levels are extremely 
low, although this problem emerges pretty far in the future. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The first section 
briefly sets out the new and revised rules. The second section presents the 
simulation framework, the baseline scenario and the path of key fiscal 
variables for OECD EU countries. The final section assesses the system of 
rules in the light of the simulations. 
2 The New and Revised Rules 
The EU fiscal framework is based on a system of fiscal rules, 
enforcement mechanisms and procedural requirements. The SGP has been 
at the core of these arrangements since its adoption in 1997. It was first 
revised in 2005. Following the recent financial crisis and against the 
background of persistent failures to apply these rules effectively (OECD, 
2010), the EU fiscal framework was strengthened again. 
The two main pillars of recent reforms are the so-called “six pack,” 
comprising five regulations and one directive, and a new 
inter-governmental treaty, including the “fiscal compact”. The “six pack” 
upgraded and revised the SGP, as well as covered other issues, including 
macroeconomic governance (OJ, 2011a-f). It also introduced new legal 
requirements for national budgetary frameworks through a directive. The 
“fiscal compact,” contained in the new treaty, requires that a rule that the 
budget position shall be “balanced or in surplus” be included in national 
law and be of “binding force and permanent character, preferably 
constitutional.” Two additional EU regulations that largely focus on 
procedures around the core requirements, the “two pack,” entered into 
force in May 2013 (EC, 2011a, 2011b). 
Most of the reforms aim at improving the enforcement of budgetary 
discipline through mechanisms and procedures, which are intended to be 
more binding than in the past. There are new procedures for both the 
“corrective arm” of the SGP and the “preventive arm” (Appendix 1). An 
important change is that many decisions by the Council on enforcing 
budgetary discipline will be taken by reverse qualified majority voting. 
This solution would make it harder to form blocking majority against the 
assessment of the European Commission (EC) (OECD, 2012a). There is 
also a wider range of sanctions, including, for the first time, financial 
sanctions under the “preventive arm” of the SGP. The possibility of earlier 
and more graduated sanctions is intended to increase their credibility. In 
the earlier system, the few financial sanctions were envisaged to be 
imposed late in the process when a country would already be facing 
problems. Much stricter requirements for statistical reporting will also 
improve the transparency and timeliness of the collection and publication 
of budgetary data for the general government and its sub-sectors. 
The new fiscal framework is largely based on the same set of budgetary 
rules as the 2005 revised SGP. There are two new rules: a debt 
convergence rule under the “corrective arm,” and a benchmark for 
expenditure growth under the “preventive arm” (Table 1). The debt 
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convergence rule is temporarily complemented by a transition rule that 
applies to countries, which were under the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
(EDP) in 2011, when the new debt convergence rule entered into force.  
 
Table	  1.	  Overview	  of	  the	  EU	  Fiscal	  Rules	  
Fiscal	  measure	  
bound	  by	  the	  rule:	  
Rule/correction:	  
Enforcement	  
mechanism:	  
General	  government	  
budget	  deficit	  
(“deficit	  rule”)	  
not	  higher	  than	  3%	  of	  GDP	  
“Corrective	  arm”	  
of	  the	  SGP,	  the	  
Excessive	  Deficit	  
Procedure	  
triggered	  in	  case	  
of	  
non-­‐compliance	  
if	  higher,	  the	  structural	  balance	  to	  be	  adjusted	  by	  min.	  0.5%	  of	  GDP	  
annually	  
General	  government	  
gross	  debt	  (“debt	  
convergence	  rule”)	  
not	  higher	  than	  60%	  of	  GDP	  
if	  higher,	  debt	  in	  excess	  of	  the	  60%	  of	  GDP	  to	  be	  reduced	  by	  1/20th	  
annually	  
	  
General	  government	  
gross	  debt	  
(“transition	  debt	  
rule”)	  
debt	  to	  be	  reduced	  so	  as	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  debt	  convergence	  rule	  
by	  the	  end	  of	  3rd	  year	  following	  exit	  from	  the	  Excessive	  Deficit	  
Procedure	  which	  was	  open	  in	  2011	  
General	  government	  
structural	  balance	  
(“MTO/structural	  
balance	  rule”)	  
not	  lower	  than	  the	  country-­‐specific	  Medium-­‐Term	  Objective	  (MTO)	   	   “Preventive	  arm”	  
of	  the	  SGP	  +	  
“fiscal	  compact”	  
(with	  stricter	  
MTO	  limits	  than	  
SGP)	  
if	  the	  MTO	  is	  not	  achieved,	  the	  structural	  balance	  to	  be	  improved	  by	  
0.5%	  of	  GDP	  annually	  in	  normal	  times	  (“transition	  to	  MTO”)	  
General	  government	  
expenditures	  
(“expenditure	  rule”)	  
growth	  of	  expenditures	  adjusted	  for	  discretionary	  revenues	  not	  
higher	  than	  the	  long-­‐run	  average	  of	  potential	  output	  growth	  
“Preventive	  arm”	  
of	  the	  SGP	  
Note:	  Text	  in	  italics	  and	  bold	  indicates	  new	  requirements.	  
Source:	  Authors’	  compilation.	  
Its aim is to provide them with a less demanding three-year 
transition period, which starts with the termination of EDP. At the end 
of the transition period, countries are required to comply fully with the 
new debt convergence rule. The EU expenditure rule requires the 
modified expenditure-to-GDP ratio to grow in line with a 10-year 
average rate of real potential output growth as estimated by the EC (see 
below)   3. The modified expenditure is net of cyclical unemployment 
spending, debt interest expenditure and spending financed through EU 
structural funds. Moreover, investment spending within this aggregate 
is smoothed over four years to limit the effect of big jumps, which are 
not unusual for public investment, on this measure. Discretionary 
                                                
3  For countries that are not yet at their MTO, a “convergence margin” is subtracted 
from their benchmark expenditure growth, in order to reach the MTO. 
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revenue measures (both revenue-increasing and -decreasing) are 
subtracted from it, to ensure a balanced budget over the medium term. 
It is then deflated by the GDP deflator, to account for the effects of 
inflation on spending. 
Furthermore, a proper enforcement of the structural budget balance 
rule in line with the MTO would effectively bring a third new rule to the 
fiscal framework. Compliance with the MTO, already a part of the revised 
SGP, was very patchy at best in the past (OECD, 2010). However, the 
strengthening of enforcement under the “preventive arm” and the putting 
in place parallel national rules in the “fiscal compact” is likely to make the 
MTOs biding in the future. 
The MTO is set in terms of the cyclically-adjusted general government 
budget position, net of one-off measures (EC, 2013). It should be set such 
as to ensure debt sustainability, including accounting for population 
ageing costs, and to provide a safety margin to the headline deficit limit of 
3% of GDP, while maintaining room for budgetary maneuver4. The rules 
impose a minimal limit on its level of -1% of GDP for the euro area 
countries. The “fiscal compact” sets an even stricter limit of -0.5% of GDP 
for countries with debt above 60% of GDP. Currently, the individual 
country MTOs range from -1.7% of GDP in Hungary to 0.5% of GDP in 
Luxembourg. The MTOs are set for all EU countries in a triennial exercise, 
coinciding with the publication of the Ageing Report by the EC. The MTO 
can be updated more often, if a country implements structural reforms 
that affects the sustainability of public finances. 
3 How Will the New Fiscal Rules Work? 
The functioning of the new EU fiscal framework is complex and 
opaque, and the implications of the rules are state contingent and thus not 
obvious. There are four target measures: the headline deficit, debt, the 
structural budget balance and expenditures, with explicit convergence 
rules for the debt-to-GDP ratio and the structural budget balance. 
Since there are no published official projections or scenarios of the 
rules’ implications, this section presents stylized simulations of fiscal 
policy under the set of fiscal rules outlined in Table 1, excluding the 
expenditure rule. Simulations are undertaken for the OECD countries in 
the European Union, with the exception of Greece and the United 
Kingdom 5 . The scenarios assume that countries strictly follow the 
minimum requirement of the most stringent rule in terms of the level of 
                                                
4  Formally, the objective of public debt sustainability or rapid progress towards 
sustainability can be written as MTO = -(60*g)/(1+g) + (0.024*d – 1.24) + 0.33*S2E, 
where g is the long-run nominal growth rate, d is the debt-to-GDP ratio, and S2E is the 
EC’s indicator of future population ageing costs. 
5  Greece is excluded because of the new EU programme, agreed in August 2015, that 
will govern fiscal adjustment instead of the fiscal rules. The United Kingdom is 
excluded, as it is not subject to numerical fiscal rules (the EDP deficit and debt 
reference values), by the virtue of Protocol 15 on certain provisions relating to the 
United Kingdom annexed to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  
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the underlying budget balance6. This excludes the possibility of countries 
running tighter than required fiscal policy or not fulfilling the rules.  
The simulations are based on deficit and debt identities and exogenous 
assumptions concerning GDP growth and interest rates taken from the 
OECD long-term projections presented in the November 2014 OECD 
Economic Outlook (Appendix 2 and Table A2.2). These projections largely 
incorporate fiscal adjustment under EDPs and EU-IMF programs as of 
mid-2014, and assume that output gaps close and GDP growth rates 
converge towards their potential. The focus is on a period from 2017 to 
2026, i.e. 10 years after the end of the Economic Outlook’s projections. 
The assumption of no feedback from fiscal policy to growth is very 
strong. Thus, Appendix 2 presents a simplified modification of the 
simulation model where GDP growth is affected by fiscal policy, assuming 
two plausible fiscal multipliers. This modification does not substantially 
change the results in terms of which rule is binding (Figure A2.1). 
However, given the assumption that rules are strictly adhered to, GDP 
growth and in turn fiscal stance becomes very volatile. This suggests that 
the strictly implementing fiscal rules may be challenging in practice given 
likely ensuing macroeconomic volatility. Consequently, the discussion of 
rules below focuses on the baseline simulation with exogenous growth. 
Under the baseline scenario, after current EDPs are closed, the MTO 
binds in the majority of countries. Given already large consolidation 
before 2014, the underlying balances are expected to be at or above MTOs 
levels in more than half of the countries already in 2017 and in most 
countries by 2019. The debt convergence rule and its transition variant 
bind in several countries over short spells at the beginning of the 
simulation period, typically after the excessive deficit correction. Only in 
Portugal and Finland, these rules bind persistently7. In cases when the 
transition or debt convergence rules bind, the implied underlying balances 
are relatively high compared with the levels required by the MTOs or 
transition to MTOs (Table A2.1 in Appendix 2), or with balances 
maintained in the past. 
 
                                                
6 When MTOs and debt convergence/transition rules imply the same level of the 
underlying budget balance (rounded to one decimal point), the MTO is chosen (Table 
A2.1 in Appendix 2). 
7  Finland is a special case. Despite low gross debt, maintaining the structural balance at 
the MTO results in breaching the 60% of GDP gross debt ceiling. Since Finland has a 
net asset position and assets as a share of GDP are assumed to be constant, it must run 
high budget surpluses to keep the gross debt-to-GDP ratio stable (Barnes et al., 2012). 
Portugal, on the other hand, has one of the highest debt levels, necessitating a larger 
surplus than implied by the MTO. This is not the case for Italy, which has similar debt 
level as Portugal, because the Italian MTO is higher than that of Portugal. 
Barnes,	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Table	  2.	  Binding	  Rules	  in	  Baseline	  Simulation	  
 
Notes:	  “3%”	  is	  the	  3%	  of	  GDP	  deficit	  ceiling	  under	  the	  current	  EDP,	  “trans.”	  is	  the	  transition	  rule,	  
“debt”	   is	   the	  debt	   convergence	   rule,	   “-­‐>MTO”	  stands	   for	   the	   transition	   to	   the	  MTO,	   “=”	  marks	  
that	   the	  MTO	   is	   reached	   and	  maintained.	   Calculations	   start	   in	   2017,	   following	   the	   end	   of	   the	  
projections	  presented	  in	  OECD	  Economic	  Outlook	  No.	  96.	  See	  Appendix	  2	  for	  further	  details.	  
Source:	  Authors’	  calculations.	  
 
The near-irrelevance of the debt convergence rule in the medium term 
in the simulations, despite high debt levels, stems from the fact that the 
MTOs imply large enough primary surpluses to lower the debt-to-GDP 
ratio at a more than sufficient pace. Moreover, as explained below, for 
countries with debt in a range immediately above 60% of GDP, the 
required debt reduction is very small and easily dominated by the MTO 
requirements. 
The assumed dominance of the EDP adjustment path and the transition 
rule avoids the more brutal front-loaded adjustment that the debt 
convergence rule by itself would imply, especially for countries with debt 
well above 60% of GDP (Fioramanti and Vicarelli, 2011; Table A2.1 in 
Appendix 2). 
Initial consolidation combined with sustained balanced budgets – in 
terms of the MTOs – would lead to a substantial reduction of gross 
debt-to-GDP ratios in most countries over the coming decade (Figure 1). 
The average annual debt decline will be generally larger for countries with 
higher initial debt levels (between 2 and 5% of GDP over 2016-26). 
Nevertheless, for two-thirds of the countries, gross debt will be still above 
60% of GDP by 2026. For a few countries with relatively low levels of debt 
(the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Luxembourg and Sweden), 
maintaining budget balances at the minimum required level would result 
in rising debt. This largely stems from the fact that stabilizing gross debt 
in countries with net financial assets requires budget surpluses which are 
relatively large compared with gross financial liabilities when gross assets 
are kept constant in relation to GDP (Barnes et al., 2012). 
 
current 
deadline
for EDP
correction 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
Austria .. .. .. .. debt = = = = = = = = =
Belgium .. .. .. .. debt = = = = = = = = =
Estonia .. .. .. .. = = = = = = = = = =
Finland .. .. .. .. debt debt debt debt debt debt debt debt debt debt
France 2017 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% trans. ->MTO ->MTO = = = = =
Germany .. .. .. .. = = = = = = = = = =
Ireland 2015 3% 3% .. ->MTO ->MTO ->MTO ->MTO = = = = = =
Italy .. .. .. .. debt = = = = = = = = =
Luxembourg .. .. .. .. = = = = = = = = = =
Netherlands .. .. .. .. debt = = = = = = = = =
Portugal 2015 3% 3% .. trans. trans. debt debt debt debt debt debt debt =
Slovak Rep. .. .. .. .. ->MTO ->MTO = = = = = = = =
Slovenia .. 3% 3% .. trans. trans. debt = = = = = = =
Spain 2016 3% 3% 3% 3% ->MTO ->MTO trans. = = = = = =
Czech Rep. .. .. .. .. = = = = = = = = = =
Denmark .. .. .. .. ->MTO = = = = = = = = =
Hungary .. .. .. .. ->MTO ->MTO = = = = = = = =
Poland 2015 3% 3% .. ->MTO ->MTO ->MTO = = = = = = =
Sweden .. .. .. .. = = = = = = = = = =
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Figure	  1.	  Gross	  Debt	  Reduction	  under	  the	  EU	  Fiscal	  Rules	  
 
(a)	  Debt	  and	  Average	  Annual	  Pace	  
of	  Debt	  Reduction 
 
(b)	  Gross	  Debt	  Levels	  
(%	  of	  GDP) 
Note:	  Gross	  debt	  refers	  to	  the	  Maastricht	  definition.	  
Source:	  OECD	  Economic	  Outlook	  No.	  96	  database	  and	  authors’	  calculations.	  
 
The simulation results are robust to a modification of the MTO rule that 
sets the consolidation target based on the output gap. Structural fiscal 
tightening can be difficult to achieve and may be self-defeating in adverse 
cyclical conditions, especially when the negative output gap is large. To 
address this issue, the EC adjusted the interpretation of the rules in 2015 
(EC, 2015). In particular, the required MTO adjustment was made 
conditional not only on the level of the debt but also on the size of the 
output gap and the position in the economic cycle as proxied by changes 
in the output gap. This adds to transparency compared with past practices 
when a laxer EC stance had been explained by vague “exceptional 
circumstances.” The inclusion of this gap-dependent rule in the 
simulations does not change results. This reflects the fact that many 
countries are expected to have achieved their MTO at the beginning of the 
simulation sample, or either output gaps are too small to yield a 
higher/lower adjustment than otherwise required or other rules (notably 
the debt convergence and transition rules) dominate. 
The baseline scenario for the sequence of the binding fiscal rules and 
their implications for the fiscal policy stance are sensitive to the 
underlying economic assumptions. Therefore, results should be treated as 
indicative only, in the view of the following five caveats. 
First, the scenarios assume that countries follow the rules exactly. This 
has not been the case in the past and there may be under or 
over-performance relative to the rules. In addition, sticking mechanically 
to the minimum fiscal rule requirements could imply a high volatility in 
the fiscal stance, limiting the likelihood that the rules will be applied 
strictly. 
Second, the simulations are sensitive to GDP growth and interest rate 
assumptions, which are exogenous to fiscal policy in the baseline scenario. 
However, if GDP growth reacts to fiscal policy, macroeconomic variables 
and structural fiscal adjustment become highly volatile. Nevertheless, 
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even under this scenario, the results are little changed compared to the 
baseline in terms of steady-state levels of debt and structural balances at 
the end of the simulations, and in terms of the sequence of binding rules. 
The exception is the debt convergence rule and its transition variant, 
which bind more often in the multiplier scenario, as debt is higher due to 
lower growth at the beginning of the simulations. 
Third, the simulations are sensitive to initial conditions regarding 
growth and fiscal outcomes and projections up to 2016. A slippage relative 
to projections would, for example, imply greater fiscal effort in future 
years. 
Fourth, it is assumed that the MTOs remain at their current levels. 
However, the MTOs can be revised every three years after the triennial 
publication of the Ageing Report of the EC. For some countries, a revision 
could imply tighter deficit ceilings and thus more consolidation and a 
faster debt decline (Barnes et al., 2012). 
Fifth, due to differences between the OECD and the EC concerning 
estimates of output gaps, automatic stabilizers’ and one-offs, the OECD 
assessment of structural balances may diverge from the official EU 
estimates, implying different structural consolidation paths8. 
4 Assessment of the New Fiscal Rules 
Using the stylized simulations, this section assesses the budgetary and 
wider implications of the new rules. This section considers the balanced 
structural budget rules, central to the new framework in terms of both 
their steady-state and dynamic implications. 
4.1 The Balanced Budget Rules Imply Very Low Steady-State 
Debt 
A well-known implication of balanced budget rules is that overall 
budget balances close to zero will typically imply very low steady-state 
debt-to-GDP ratios (except at very low nominal growth rates). The 
calculation of the MTO and the requirements of the “fiscal compact” 
partially recognize this problem, under the MTO formula and through an 
override in the new treaty’s balanced budget requirements in cases where 
debt is low and there are no other long-run sustainability issues. However, 
this crucial leeway is bounded from below by a deficit of 1% of GDP. Even 
this requirement implies very low steady-state debt-to-GDP ratios over the 
range of nominal growth rates (Figure 2). 
 
                                                
8 The EC (D’Auria et al., 2010) and the OECD (Johansson et al., 2013) calculate potential 
output in a similar way, using a Cobb-Douglas production function with labour and 
capital inputs, but implementation details differ. Consequently, potential output 
growth rates and output gaps differ for some countries. The cyclical adjustment of 
budget balances of this paper is the same as the one adopted by the EC (Larch and 
Turrini, 2009), though the elasticities of budget balances with respect to the output 
gap differ slightly.  
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Figure	  2.	  Steady-­‐State	  Net	  Debt-­‐to-­‐GDP	  Ratio	  
	  
Notes:	  The	  figure	  indicates	  the	  level	  of	  net	  debt	  as	  per	  cent	  of	  GDP	  at	  which	  debt	  stabilizes	  if	  the	  
budget	  deficit	   is	   indefinitely	  sustained	  at	  0,	  0.5	  and	  1%	  of	  GDP,	  and	  nominal	  GDP	  grows	  at	   the	  
rate	   indicated	  on	   the	  horizontal	   axis.	   The	   level	   is	   calculated	   as	  nd*=-­‐(1+g)/g*b,	  where	  g	   is	   the	  
growth	  rate	  and	  nd*	   is	  the	  steady-­‐state	  debt	  ratio,	  b	   is	  the	  overall	  budget	  balance-­‐to-­‐GDP	  ratio	  
(for	  more	  details	  see	  Barnes	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  
Source:	  Authors’	  calculations.	  
 
In the coming years, pushing explicit liabilities down to a very low level 
may be warranted where there are large implicit liabilities (such as 
unfunded pension commitments)9 that can partly be accommodated by 
holding debt below an otherwise appropriate level. Nevertheless, it is a 
weakness that the “fiscal compact” seeks to put in place rules of a 
“permanent” character that are unlikely to be tenable on a permanent 
basis. This also suggests that inserting a numerical value of the “budget 
balance” in the constitution, as proposed by the “fiscal compact”, may not 
be a good idea. 
4.2 The Consolidation Pace Will Be Demanding 
The appropriate policy stance during a phase of debt reduction must 
balance consolidation requirements with the effects of fiscal retrenchment 
on aggregate demand and the need to signal a credible commitment to 
fiscal discipline (OECD, 2012b). However, there is no clear quantitative 
benchmark for the appropriate pace of consolidation or the appropriate 
budget balance or the appropriate pace of debt reduction. Nevertheless, 
past experience may indicate revealed preferences and what is feasible. 
The current consolidation process will be large and prolonged by 
historical standards. The length and depth of the total consolidation effort 
since 2009/10 would be around 5% of GDP or more in half of the 
countries. This is relatively high by historical OECD standards (Guichard 
                                                
9 For instance, the latest EC Ageing Report projects age-related expenditure to increase 
by 2040 by more than 4% of GDP in Slovenia, Luxembourg and Belgium (EC, 2015b).  
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et al., 2007; OECD, 2012c; Figure 3). Half of the countries in the sample 
have managed to implement a larger consolidation in the past, but it had 
not been sustained. The post-2009 consolidation effort has largely been 
guided by the EDP and EU-IMF programs – as incorporated in the OECD 
Economic Outlook projections (OECD, 2014). Post-EDP consolidation 
guided by the rules is expected to be modest (Figure 3). This underlines 
the centrality of the recent EDPs and EU-IMF programs in guiding the 
current consolidation process, with the new system of rules gradually 
coming into play. Given the large scale of the required consolidation in 
many countries, the outcome under current EDPs will be a key test of the 
renewed commitment to greater fiscal discipline in the euro area and the 
credibility of the governance regime. The pace of consolidation of 0.5% of 
GDP in the underlying position under the balanced budget requirements 
is fairly modest compared with what some countries have already 
undertaken since the crisis started. 
 
Figure	  3.	  Consolidation	  under	  the	  EU	  Fiscal	  Rules	  (%	  of	  Potential	  GDP)	  
 
Changes	  in	  the	  Underlying	  
Budget	  Balance1 
 
(b)	  Changes	  in	  the	  Underlying	  
Primary	  Budget	  Balance1 
Notes:	   Past	   effort	   relates	   to	   the	   biggest	   consolidation	   between	   1990	   and	   2008	   (depending	   on	  
data	   availability).	   The	   sample	   2017-­‐26	   refers	   to	   the	  baseline	   simulations	   of	   the	   EU	   fiscal	   rules.	  
Past	   consolidation	  denotes	   the	   cumulative	   positive	   change	   in	   the	  underlying	   (primary)	   balance	  
over	  an	  uninterrupted	  period	  of	  years	  during	  which	  the	  balance	  improved	  annually.	  This	  period,	  
however,	  includes	  years	  when	  the	  balance	  worsened	  by	  up	  to	  0.3%	  of	  potential	  GDP.	  
1	  For	  Finland,	  Germany,	  Hungary,	  Poland,	  the	  Slovak	  Republic	  and	  Sweden,	  the	  2009-­‐15	  sample	  
begins	  in	  2010	  or	  2011,	  reflecting	  the	  actual	  start	  of	  consolidation.	  
Source:	  OECD	  Economic	  Outlook	  No.	  96	  database	  and	  authors’	  calculations.	  
 
4.3 The Fiscal Stance Will Need to Be Tight for Many Years 
The post-consolidation budget balance stance in terms of the level of the 
required balance under the rules would be tighter in both overall and 
primary terms than over any five-year period on average during the past 
three decades in most euro area countries where data are available (Figure 
4). This is particularly true for the required overall underlying balance. 
Moreover, the balances implied by the rules look even higher when 
compared with past levels attained in periods of below-average growth. 
The highest levels of budget balances were usually achieved and sustained 
in periods of high growth. 
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Figure	  4.	  Fiscal	  Policy	  Stance	  under	  the	  EU	  Fiscal	  Rules	  (%	  of	  Potential	  GDP)	  
 
(a)	  Level	  of	  the	  Underlying	  
Budget	  Balance 
 
(b)	  Level	  of	  the	  Underlying	  
Primary	  Budget	  Balance 
Notes:	   Past	   level	   relates	   to	   the	   country-­‐specific	   5-­‐year	   period	   since	   1990	   (depending	   on	   data	  
availability)	  with	  the	  highest	  average	  level	  of	  underlying	  budget	  balances.	  Past	  level	  –	  high	  growth	  
refers	   to	   the	   highest	   average	   balance	   of	   underlying	   budget	   balance	   in	   a	   5-­‐year	   period	   with	  
above-­‐average	   GDP	   growth.	   Past	   level	   –	   low	   growth	   refers	   to	   the	   highest	   average	   balance	   of	  
underlying	   budget	   balance	   in	   a	   5-­‐year	   period	   with	   below-­‐average	   GDP	   growth.	   Average	   GDP	  
growth	  was	  computed	  over	  1980-­‐2014.	  The	  sample	  2017-­‐26	  refers	  to	  the	  baseline	  simulations	  of	  
the	  EU	  fiscal	  rules.	  
Source:	  OECD	  Economic	  Outlook	  No.	  96	  database	  and	  authors’	  calculations.	  
 
The differences with past performance are, however, arguably not 
enormous on average. The additional annual effort under the rules 
compared with past experience in terms of the maintained budget balance 
is typically of the order of 1% of GDP. Nevertheless, in some countries 
(e.g. France, Italy, Slovenia and Spain), the structural balance requirement 
is more than 1% of GDP higher than balances typically attained in the 
past, especially compared with those attained in periods of below-average 
growth. Given that some countries have achieved such a performance in 
the past, the EU fiscal rules can therefore be seen as requiring almost all 
countries to move closer to what countries that reduced the debt-to-GDP 
ratio in the past were able to do. This is desirable in view of the trend 
increase in government debt in most countries since the 1970s, which 
contributed to very high debt at present. 
In most countries, the best performance in terms of the budget balance 
was immediately prior to the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008. This 
reflects the general, if insufficient, improvement in budget balances in the 
run-up to and during monetary union compared with earlier experience. 
These budget balances were maintained in the context of nominal GDP 
growth that is similar to that forecast for 2017 to 2026, except for those 
economies that built up large current account imbalances and are expected 
to grow less rapidly. 
In the medium term, macroeconomic conditions may not, however, be 
as conducive for public finances as before the crisis. Many governments 
benefited from “revenue buoyancy” in the pre-crisis period thanks to 
booms in the financial and housing markets. This is unlikely to be a 
supporting factor in the future. With many European countries having 
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budget balances at levels that have been rarely achieved in the past, this 
could keep overall demand weak and limit the offset of restrictive fiscal 
policies by exports10. Moreover, choosing the appropriate structure of 
consolidation measures will be crucial. If productive public investment or 
education spending is cut, the fiscal consolidation may result in lower 
potential output (Cournéde et al., 2013). 
4.4 Resetting the MTOs Could Push the Tightness of Policy 
Further Beyond Previous Norms 
As the baseline scenario shows, the main effect of the EU fiscal rules – 
once the consolidation is completed – would be to maintain structural 
budget balances at the MTOs for a long period. The methodology for 
setting MTOs would appear to demand going forward an even stricter 
budget balance for high-debt countries, mainly driven by projected 
increases in debt-to-GDP ratios. In addition, slower projected 
medium-term nominal growth increases the required budget balance, 
owing to worse debt dynamics. Given the front-loading of consolidation, 
this “belt and braces” approach could be viewed as being excessive in 
requiring a further front-loading of the fiscal adjustment. 
4.5 Cyclical Adjustment Is Challenging 
Measures of structural balance have theoretical advantages but are 
difficult to implement in practice and this could undermine fiscal rules 
based on them. The structural budget balance shows the balance net of the 
effects of the business cycle and any temporary measures. Thus, its change 
should indicate discretionary changes in fiscal policy and fiscal rules 
based on it should allow automatic stabilizers to work. The output gap 
and the semi-elasticity used to calculate the structural balance are 
unobserved. There are several ways to estimate them. Results vary 
depending on a particular method employed and are estimated with large 
uncertainty, especially in real time. The EU uses a common methodology 
to estimate output gaps, based on a production function approach (EC, 
2005, 2006). This approach ensures cross-country consistency but may 
prevent the EC from fully reflecting diverse circumstances across 
economies. 
Output gap estimates are revised frequently, implying that the 
assessment of the required and achieved fiscal effort may change over 
time. For instance, the unweighted average absolute revision in budget 
balances for 2007 between the EC’s Autumn 2008 and its Autumn 2011 
forecasts was 1.3% of GDP (Figure 5). This suggests a revision of the 
output gap of around 2.6% of GDP, based on an average semi-elasticity of 
the budget balance to the output gap of about 0.5. To mitigate this 
                                                
10 Simultaneous consolidation in the euro area countries in 2011-13 is found to have 
damped output via cross-border spillovers (Int’Veld, 2013). Although these results 
were obtained under crisis conditions (high share of credit-constrained households 
and interest rates at the zero lower bound), these conditions are not likely to 
disappear in the euro area anytime soon. 
REVIEW	  OF	  ECONOMICS	  AND	  INSTITUTIONS	  Vol.	  7,	  Issue	  1,	  Winter-­‐Spring	  2016,	  Article	  2	  
 
Copyright  ©  2016  University  of  Perugia  Electronic  Press.  All  rights  reserved.  
 
14	  
problem, the EC uses its most favorable forecast of the output gap and 
structural balance between its most recent forecast and forecast made in 
spring of the previous year. A similar provision, which accounts for 
revisions of output gap projections between the start of the EDP and the 
ex-post assessment, applies to structural effort under the “corrective arm”. 
 
Figure	   5.	   EC’s	   Estimates	   of	   the	   2007	   Structural	   Balance	   in	   2008	   and	   2011	   (%	   of	  
Potential	  GDP)	  
	  
Source:	  European	  Commission	  European	  Economic	  Forecasts.	  
 
Cyclical tax revenues may not be captured adequately with constant 
semi-elasticities of tax revenues with respect to the output gap. During the 
upswing of the credit cycle, estimates of the structural budget balance 
failed to account for the revenue buoyancy generated by booms in asset 
prices, including real estate, and in the construction sector (Price and 
Dang, 2011). To minimize this bias, structural consolidation effort under 
the “corrective arm” is adjusted for possible revenue windfall or shortfall, 
and is complemented by a bottom-up assessment of consolidation 
measures taken. In the “preventive arm”, the time-varying sensitivity of 
revenues to the cycle and changes in their structure is only partially 
accounted for because the change in the structural balance (adjustment 
towards the MTO) is assessed together with expenditure benchmark 
compliance (see below). The EC also tries to consider the main 
discretionary budgetary measures in the bottom-up assessment but they 
are not formally included in the assessment of fiscal rules. 
The refinements to the MTO rule implementation address the known 
shortcomings of structural budget balance rules but they also add to the 
complexity and hence reduce the transparency. Moreover, the refinements 
are not applied consistently throughout both arms of the SGP nor 
throughout all the rules. They only apply to the structural balance but not, 
for instance, the debt convergence rule. 
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4.6 Expenditure Rule 
The expenditure rule is, in principle, more immune to the drawbacks of 
cyclical adjustment mentioned above. In general, if the expenditure to 
GDP ratio is required to grow in line with potential GDP, this rule is 
equivalent to the structural balance rule, without some of its limitations, 
such as the reliance on uncertain estimates of cyclically-adjusted revenues 
and their structure. Although the rule also uses an unobserved potential 
output growth, it tends to be less prone to revisions than output gap level 
(Koske and Pain, 2008; Bouis et al., 2012) and can be made even more 
stable by using medium-term growth averages. It supports debt 
sustainability in that it motivates the government to use non-structural 
windfall revenues generated during booms to pay down debt, rather than 
to increase spending. At the same time, it allows for revenue shortfalls 
during recessions. 
The expenditure rule still has some drawbacks. The greatest is the offset 
of the discretionary revenue measures corresponding to the bottom-up 
fiscal effort assessment in the “corrective arm”. In theory, accounting for 
discretionary measures ensures balancing the structural revenues with 
expenditures and hence the attainment of a balanced budget in the long 
run. However, adjusting for discretionary measures is not easy in practice. 
They do not rely on cyclical adjustment, but their quantification requires a 
counterfactual, usually a “no-policy-change” (NPC) scenario. The size of 
the direct effects of a policy measure has to be estimated and is thus 
subject to uncertainty. Hence, both the NPC and the actual additional 
effect of the policy measures are difficult to quantify. Moreover, there is no 
EU-wide common methodology or guidelines for estimating discretionary 
measures. The measures are usually quantified by the respective 
government and may not be comparable across member countries. 
4.7 Overall Design of the Rules 
Multiple rules add to the complexity of the system considerably 
without yielding clear gains. This is further reinforced by the complicated 
and often inconsistent implementation of the rules. The EC main 
document explaining the rules (EC, 2012), not including all the 
refinements introduced since then, together with the 2015 interpretation 
document (EC, 2015a) are 140 pages long. Consequently, it may be 
difficult to achieve political or public “buy-in” around the framework, and 
options to develop fiscal rules at the national level may become severely 
curtailed. This partly reflects the different institutional status of the 
different rules, but again such a distinction does not appear a necessary 
part of having fiscal rules at the EU level. Furthermore, poorly designed 
rules without solid foundations can undermine the credibility of the 
framework as a whole. 
One way to reduce the complexity at little cost would have been not to 
introduce the new debt convergence rule, and use the MTO or the 
expenditure benchmark rule instead as the measure of sufficient progress 
towards the debt limit of 60% of GDP. As shown in the baseline scenario, 
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the debt convergence rule adds very little to the EU fiscal framework from 
a substantive economic perspective. The MTOs are sufficient in the 
medium to long term to bring down debt, whereas the debt convergence 
rule tends to require large, potentially self-defeating, adjustment over 
short periods. Adding a rule that is close to redundant or that creates 
macroeconomic volatility when it binds has a high cost in terms of 
complexity relative to the gains its imposition achieves. In addition, the 
debt convergence rule lacks a sound economic rationale and could imply 
very high budget surpluses for countries with very high debt, while 
having very little impact on countries where debt is above but close to 60% 
of GDP11. The main justification of this rule is procedural. The debt 
convergence rule is subject to the stricter enforcement requirements of the 
“corrective arm” of the SGP, while the MTO and expenditure benchmark 
are part of the “preventive arm.”  
5 Conclusions  
The baseline simulations of this paper suggest that balanced budget 
requirements in structural terms will be in practice at the heart of the new 
EU fiscal rules. In terms of the current phase of consolidation, for most EU 
countries additional efforts after 2016 guided by the rules will be modest 
relative to the consolidation that has already taken place or that is 
programmed under the EDPs. This underlines the importance of 
successfully implementing the current EDPs in shoring up credibility. If 
consolidation is not successfully achieved during the coming years, the 
new framework will have much more work to do in terms of achieving 
consolidation with negative implications for the credibility of the whole 
system. 
The role of the rules will be, in essence, to ensure that the fiscal stance is 
sufficiently tight to bring down debt-to-GDP ratios to more prudent levels. 
This kind of constraint on policy in “good times” is exactly where fiscal 
rules are needed to deal with political economy pressure to spend rather 
than save. The implied fiscal stance under the new EU fiscal rules, both in 
overall and primary balance terms, can be thought of as requiring all 
countries to meet the standards of those that managed to make 
meaningful progress in tackling high debt levels in the past. 
The system of rules carries some risks. This includes their complexity. 
The potential future revisions of the MTOs, and in some instances the debt 
convergence rule, could require much tighter budget balances than in the 
past. The resulting large consolidation could not only affect aggregate 
demand negatively, but also potential growth when inappropriate 
measures are adopted. Furthermore, the measurement of the structural 
budget balance is likely to create problems, so it may be more appropriate 
to rely on the expenditure rule instead. Mechanical rules are never able to 
                                                
11 In addition, the approach used in the debt convergence rule arguably further increases 
the emphasis on gross, rather than net, debt and could create incentives for sale or 
transfer of assets.  
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cover all contingencies and may thus become suboptimal (Wyplosz, 2012). 
For this reason, it is essential that the new EU fiscal rules are applied with 
appropriate discretion (OECD, 2012a). The rules need to be enforced 
tightly where this is necessary, but it would be harmful and 
counterproductive in terms of the credibility of the fiscal framework to 
apply them too mechanistically. This highlights the importance of national 
and EU efforts to put in place independent expert fiscal councils at the 
national level. 
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Appendix 1: Key Reforms to the Stability and Growth 
Pact 
This appendix reviews the recent key reforms to the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). 
Faster and Clearer Implementation of the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP) 
A numerical benchmark for reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio when it is 
above 60%: the debt ratio must fall by an amount approximately 
one-twentieth of the debt excess over the 60% ceiling, taking into account 
the effect of the cycle. For three years following the correction of excessive 
deficits, i.e. when the new rule enters into force, the benchmark does not 
apply in full, but sufficient progress towards compliance is necessary. 
The previous definition of “exceptional” circumstances as a major 
“unusual event outside the control” of the government is complemented 
by a “severe economic downturn for the euro area or the European Union 
as a whole”. 
There is a stronger economic assessment of compliance, including 
implicit liabilities, up-front costs of pension reforms and other structural 
reforms, excessive macroeconomic imbalances and potential growth. 
According to the latest EC interpretation, structural reform plans could 
even serve as a waiver for structural adjustment under both arms of the 
SGP (EC, 2015a). 
Corrective action can be requested within three months, compared with 
the standard deadline of up to six months, if the EC identifies an urgent 
need for action. 
Clearer Requirements under the “Preventive Arm” 
The country-specific budgetary Medium-Term Objectives (MTOs) for 
the cyclically-adjusted budget balance (net of one-offs) remain in place 
together with the required 0.5% of GDP consolidation per year to reach 
the MTO. “Windfall revenues” and the impact of structural reforms are 
taken into account. 
The benchmark for a “significant” deviation from MTOs is set at 0.5% 
of GDP in one year or 0.25% of GDP per year over two years, while 
compliance with an expenditure benchmark, windfall revenues, up-front 
costs of pension reforms and events outside a country’s control should 
also be taken into account. For countries with debt above 60% of GDP or 
“pronounced sustainability risks”, an improvement of more than the 
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existing 0.5% of GDP consolidation benchmark will be considered. In 
addition to the debt level, the EC recently made the required MTO 
adjustment conditional on the output gap and its changes (EC, 2015a). 
The procedure for determining non-compliance is expected to take six 
months at the most. The EC should formally report its recommendations 
to the Council. If a EC’s recommendation is not taken up by the Council, 
the recommendation is subject to approval on a reverse simple majority 
votes. 
Assessment of the progress towards MTOs now includes the path of 
expenditure (net of discretionary revenue measures), which is be expected 
to grow below a medium-term growth rate of potential GDP until the 
MTO is achieved. Expenditures exclude interest, unemployment benefits 
and EU matching payments. 
Effective Enforcement of Budgetary Discipline for the Euro 
Area Countries 
An interest bearing deposit of up to 0.2% of GDP is required, where a 
country fails to take action in response to a Council’s recommendation to 
correct a “significant deviation” from the MTO. The Council’s decision is 
subject to reverse qualified-majority voting, although qualified-majority 
voting can amend the proposal. 
A non-interest bearing deposit of up to 0.2% of GDP can be required if 
the Council identifies an excessive deficit and a country is already subject 
to an interest bearing deposit or non-compliance is “particularly serious”. 
A fine of up to 0.2% of GDP if the Council, acting under Article 126(8) 
of the EU Treaty, decides that a country has not taken effective action to 
correct its excessive deficit. Outstanding non-interest bearing deposits will 
be converted to a fine. The fine under Article 126(11) of the Treaty remains 
available. 
The EC will have the power to investigate where there are “serious 
indications” of possible manipulation of statistics, which may be 
sanctioned with a fine of up to 0.2% of GDP. 
Appendix 2: Assumptions Underling Fiscal 
Simulations 
Fiscal Rules 
The most binding rule in terms of the required underlying budget 
balance is assumed to apply between 2017 and 2026. Prior to 2017 the 
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fiscal projections of the November 2014 OECD Economic Outlook are 
taken (OECD, 2014). They largely incorporate fiscal adjustment under 
EDPs and EU-IMF programs, implying that for most countries which are 
still under EDPs, they will be ended by 2016. The following rules are 
analyzed. 
The 3% deficit ceiling: the headline deficit should not exceed 3% of 
GDP. If it does, the structural balance in the following year is reduced by 
0.5% of potential GDP. It is assumed that during the EDPs the 3% deficit 
ceiling rule takes precedence over the other rules even if the debt 
convergence rule or the MTO requirements imply a larger adjustment. 
Debt convergence rule: if the debt-to-GDP ratio (Maastricht definition) 
exceeds 60%, the debt ratio should be reduced by 1/20th of the excess over 
60% of GDP per year. According to the EC guidelines (EFC, 2012), this 
implies achieving the backward-looking benchmark debt target: 
d*t = 60+0.95/3(dt-1-60)+0.952/3(dt-2-60)+0.953/3(dt-3-60) 
where dt is the debt to GDP ratio in year t. In practice, in addition to the 
backward-looking benchmark, this rule also has a forward-looking and a 
cyclically-adjusted dimension and at least one of the three has to be 
complied with, but the latter two are not used in the simulations. 
Debt transition rule: for countries that were in the EDP in November 
2011, the debt convergence rule will start applying in the fourth year after 
the correction of the EDP. During this transition period, the debt ratio has 
to decline at a sufficient pace, approximated in the scenario by a constant 
adjustment of the underlying balance between year t and t+4 which 
ensures meeting the backward-looking part of the debt convergence rule 
in year t+4. The required annual structural adjustment during this 
transition period in the simulation cannot exceed 0.75% of GDP. 
The Medium-Term Objective (MTO): the structural balance objective 
agreed for each country must be met (Table A2.1) and, if not, progress 
towards it should be made by consolidating 0.5% of potential GDP each 
year. Countries that have met their MTOs are assumed to retain that 
stance in terms of the underlying budget balance. MTOs are kept constant 
over the simulation period. 
 
The benchmark for expenditure is not modeled, as it is equivalent in 
the context of this exercise to maintaining the structural balance at a 
constant level. 
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Baseline Model Simulations 
The simulations are based on set of budget balance and debt accounting 
identities: 
 NLGXQ  !   = 𝑁𝐿𝐺𝑋𝑄𝑈!   + 𝑒 ∗ 𝐺𝐴𝑃! / 1+ 𝐺𝐴𝑃!/100 	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (A2.1)	  
𝑁𝐿𝐺𝑄! = 100 ∗ 𝑁𝐿𝐺𝑋! − !""!!"" ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐴!!! + !"#!!"" ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐿!!! /𝐺𝐷𝑃!	   	   	   (A2.2)	  𝐺𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑄! = 100 ∗ 𝐺𝑁𝐹𝐿!!! − 𝑁𝐿𝐺! /𝐺𝐷𝑃!	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (A2.3)	  𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐿𝑄! = 𝐺𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑄! + 𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐴𝑄!	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (A2.4)	  𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐴𝑄! = 𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐴𝑄!!!	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (A2.5)	  
where NLGX and NLGXU are actual and structural primary budget 
balance, NLG is the overall budget balance, GNFLQ and GGFLQ are net 
and gross general government debt, GGFA is general government (gross) 
assets, IRR and IRP are implicit interest rates earned on assets and paid on 
debt, GAP is an output gap as a per cent of potential GDP, GDP is nominal 
(actual) GDP, and e is the semi-elasticity of the budget balance with 
respect to the output gap, based on the OECD estimates from Girouard 
and André (2005). Variables with Q and QU at the end are expressed as a 
percent of actual and potential (nominal) GDP, respectively. For the sake 
of simplicity, equation (A2.5) assumes that financial assets are kept 
unchanged as a share of GDP from their 2016 levels, as projected in OECD 
(2014). 
Actual and potential GDP and implicit interest rates earned on assets 
and paid on debt are exogenous. They are taken from the OECD long-term 
projections, derived from a growth convergence framework (Johansson et 
al., 2013). In this framework, potential output is based on a Cobb-Douglas 
production function of projected trend employment, human and physical 
capital and labor efficiency. 
Alternative Model Simulations with Endogenous GDP Growth, 
Inflation and Interest Rates 
To allow for more realistic simulations, alternative model assumes a 
simple feedback between the fiscal policy stance and GDP growth, and 
endogeneity of inflation and interest rates as set out below. 
 
Actual real GDP GDPV growth is assumed to converge to potential 
output GDPVTR growth and reacts with a one-year lag to changes in the 
primary structural balance: 
 𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑉! =	  = 𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑉𝑇𝑅! +	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+  0.2 ∗ 𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑉!!! 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑉𝑇𝑅!!! −	  −0.3 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔  (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑉!!! 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑉𝑇𝑅!!!)+ 𝐹𝑀 ∗ 𝑑(𝑁𝐿𝐺𝑋𝑈!!!)  	   	   	   	   (A2.6)	  
 
The convergence parameters imply that the initial output gaps estimated 
for the EU countries are mostly closed after 4-5 years since the beginning 
of the simulations. Sensitivity analysis assumes fiscal multipliers ranging 
from -0.5 to -1.0, reflecting different combinations of expenditure and 
revenue-based consolidation measures and the assumption that the zero 
lower bound and crisis-related financial frictions do not bind. 
 
Inflation (π) is modeled as an inflation expectation augmented Philips 
curve: 
 𝜋! = 0.3 ∗ 𝜋!!! + 0.7 ∗ 𝜋!"#$%! + 0.2 ∗ 𝐺𝐴𝑃!	   	   	   	   	   	   (A2.7)	  
 
where inflation expectations are assumed to be a weighted average of past 
inflation and inflation target (πtarget) of 2%.  
 
The short-term interest rate (IRS) responds to the change in the output 
gap and converges to a natural nominal interest rate determined by the 
inflation target and long-term potential output growth: 
 Δ𝐼𝑅𝑆! =   −0.2 ∗ 𝐼𝑅𝑆!!! − 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 − ((𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑉!!! 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑉𝑇𝑅!!!")   !!" − 1)−  −  𝜋!"#$%! + 0.5 ∗ Δ𝐺𝐴𝑃!	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (A2.8)	  
 
The long-term interest rate (IRL) is modeled as a 10-year average of 
future short-term interests, plus a country-specific term premium term, 
and a fiscal risk premium (FiscRisk): 
 𝐼𝑅𝐿! = 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 +    𝐼𝑅𝑆!!!/10!!!! + 𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘!,	   	   	   	   	   	   (A2.9)	  
The fiscal risk premium is zero when gross government debt is below or 
equal to 75% of GDP and it increases by 2 basis points for each percentage 
point of debt exceeding 75% of GDP and by additional 2 basis points for 
debt exceeding 125% of GDP. 
 
The implicit interest rate paid on gross government debt (IRP) is 
modeled as a weighted average of the past implicit interest rate and the 
current long-term and short-term market interest rates: 
 𝐼𝑅𝑃! = 1− 𝑅𝐹𝑆𝐻!   ∗ 𝐼𝑅𝑃!!! + 𝑅𝐹𝑆𝐻! ∗ (0.25 ∗ 𝐼𝑅𝑆! + 0.75 ∗ 𝐼𝑅𝐿!)	   	   (A2.10)	  
 
REVIEW	  OF	  ECONOMICS	  AND	  INSTITUTIONS	  Vol.	  7,	  Issue	  1,	  Winter-­‐Spring	  2016,	  Article	  2	  
 
Copyright  ©  2016  University  of  Perugia  Electronic  Press.  All  rights  reserved.  
 
26	  
The weights (RFSH) reflect the share of debt maturing within one year. 
 
Changes in the implicit interest rate received on government financial 
assets (IRR) reflect changes in the short-term interest rate and changes in 
the OECD aggregate long-term interest rate IRLOECD: 
 Δ𝐼𝑅𝑅! = 0.95 ∗ Δ𝐼𝑅𝐿!!"#$ + 0.05 ∗ Δ𝐼𝑅𝑆!	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (A2.11)	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Table	   A2.1.	   Underlying	   Budget	   Balances	   under	   MTO,Transition	   and	   Debt	   Rules	   for	  
Selected	  EU	  Countries	  (%	  of	  Potential	  GDP)	  
 
Notes:	  “trans.”	  is	  the	  transition	  rule,	  “debt”	  is	  the	  debt	  convergence	  rule,	  “MTO”	  stands	  for	  the	  
transition	  to	  the	  MTO	  or	  marks	  that	  the	  MTO	  is	  reached	  and	  maintained.	   	  
Source:	  Authors’	  calculations.	  
 
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
Austria MTO -0.9 -0.7 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
trans -0.9 -0.7 -0.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
debt -0.9 -0.7 -0.4 0.4 -0.7 -0.9 -1.1 -1.3 -1.5 -1.7 -1.8 -1.9 -1.9
Belgium MTO -2.0 -1.3 -0.6 -0.1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
trans -2.0 -1.3 -0.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
debt -2.0 -1.3 -0.6 0.6 -1.6 -2.7 -3.1 -3.4 -3.6 -3.8 -4.0 -4.1 -4.2
Czech Rep. MTO -0.5 -1.0 -0.7 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
trans -0.5 -1.0 -0.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
debt -0.5 -1.0 -0.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Denmark MTO -1.5 -1.6 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
trans -1.5 -1.6 -1.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
debt -1.5 -1.6 -1.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Estonia MTO 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
trans 0.3 0.3 0.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
debt 0.3 0.3 0.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Finland MTO -1.1 -0.7 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
trans -1.1 -0.7 -0.4 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
debt -1.1 -0.7 -0.4 4.1 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.9
France MTO -3.4 -3.0 -2.7 -2.2 -1.7 -1.2 -0.6 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
trans -3.4 -3.0 -2.7 -1.9 -1.4 -1.1 -0.9 -0.8 .. .. .. .. ..
debt -3.4 -3.0 -2.7 4.5 2.4 0.9 -0.2 -1.0 -1.6 -2.0 -2.1 -2.2 -2.3
Germany MTO 0.3 0.1 0.1 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
trans 0.3 0.1 0.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
debt 0.3 0.1 0.1 -2.1 -1.2 -1.0 -1.0 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1
Hungary MTO -3.5 -3.0 -2.9 -2.4 -1.9 -1.7 -1.7 -1.7 -1.7 -1.7 -1.7 -1.7 -1.7
trans -3.5 -3.0 -2.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
debt -3.5 -3.0 -2.9 -2.5 -2.9 -3.4 -3.7 -3.8 -3.8 -3.8 -3.8 -3.8 -3.7
Ireland MTO -2.2 -2.3 -2.3 -1.8 -1.3 -0.8 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
trans -2.2 -2.3 -2.3 -1.8 -1.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
debt -2.2 -2.3 -2.3 -0.8 -0.9 -1.4 -2.3 -3.0 -3.5 -3.7 -3.7 -3.7 -3.6
Italy MTO 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
trans 0.1 0.3 0.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
debt 0.1 0.3 0.7 5.7 -1.2 -1.4 -0.8 -1.6 -2.1 -2.5 -2.8 -3.1 -3.2
Luxembourg MTO 2.5 1.7 1.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
trans 2.5 1.7 1.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
debt 2.5 1.7 1.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Netherlands MTO -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
trans -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
debt -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 0.8 -1.1 -1.6 -1.6 -1.8 -1.9 -1.9 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0
Poland MTO -3.2 -2.8 -2.6 -2.1 -1.6 -1.1 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
trans -3.2 -2.8 -2.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
debt -3.2 -2.8 -2.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Portugal MTO -1.6 -0.9 -0.9 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
trans -1.6 -0.9 -0.9 -0.4 0.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
debt -1.6 -0.9 -0.9 4.3 2.7 1.5 0.1 0.3 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6
Slovak Rep. MTO -2.9 -2.3 -1.9 -1.4 -0.9 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
trans -2.9 -2.3 -1.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
debt -2.9 -2.3 -1.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Slovenia MTO -1.8 -1.2 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
trans -1.8 -1.2 -1.0 -0.2 0.2 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
debt -1.8 -1.2 -1.0 3.3 1.7 0.4 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Spain MTO -2.6 -2.1 -1.6 -1.1 -0.6 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
trans -2.6 -2.1 -1.6 -1.1 -0.6 -0.1 0.4 .. .. .. .. .. ..
debt -2.6 -2.1 -1.6 3.9 1.9 0.6 -0.2 -1.0 -1.1 -1.2 -1.3 -1.5 -1.6
Sweden MTO -0.7 -0.6 -0.1 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
trans -0.7 -0.6 -0.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
debt -0.7 -0.6 -0.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
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Table	  A2.2.	  Summary	  of	  Macroeconomic	  Assumptions	  for	  the	  Baseline	  Simulation	  
	  
Average	  levels	  2017-­‐26	   	  
(in	  %;	  st.	  dev.	  in	  parentheses)	   2016	  levels	  
	  
Real	  
GDP	  
growth	  
Infla
tion	  
Implicit	  
interest	  
rate	  paid	  
Output	  
gap	  
(%	  of	  
potential	  
GDP)	  
Maastr
icht	  debt	  
(%	  of	  GDP)	  
Budget	  
balance	  
(%	  of	  GDP)	  
Austria	   2.0	   1.9	   2.2	   -­‐3.4	   84.4	   -­‐1.8	  
	   (0.2)	   (0.2)	   (0.3)	   	  	   	   	  
Belgium	   2.1	   2.0	   2.3	   -­‐1.2	   105.0	   -­‐1.3	  
	   (0.2)	   (0.1)	   (0.3)	   	  	   	   	  
Czech	  Republic	   3.8	   1.9	   3.7	   -­‐2.3	   44.8	   -­‐1.5	  
	   (0.3)	   (0.1)	   (0.8)	   	  	   	   	  
Denmark	   1.7	   2.0	   2.4	   -­‐1.1	   50.7	   -­‐2.3	  
	   (0.1)	   (0.1)	   (0.2)	   	  	   	   	  
Estonia	   3.1	   2.0	   2.0	   -­‐2.1	   8.0	   -­‐0.2	  
	   (0.5)	   (0.1)	   (0.6)	   	  	   	   	  
Finland	   2.4	   1.9	   2.1	   -­‐2.8	   62.4	   -­‐1.8	  
	   (0.2)	   (0.2)	   (0.4)	   	  	   	   	  
France	   2.3	   1.9	   2.4	   -­‐2.8	   101.8	   -­‐4.1	  
	   (0.1)	   (0.2)	   (0.5)	   	  	   	   	  
Germany	   1.1	   2.0	   2.1	   -­‐0.6	   69.5	   0.2	  
	   (0.1)	   (0.0)	   (0.4)	   	  	   	   	  
Greece	   4.3	   1.7	   4.7	   -­‐8.7	   171.4	   0.2	  
	   (0.5)	   (0.5)	   (0.8)	   	  	   	   	  
Hungary	   2.3	   3.0	   5.2	   0.7	   75.7	   -­‐2.5	  
	   (0.2)	   (0.0)	   (0.3)	   	  	   	   	  
Ireland	   3.6	   1.9	   3.4	   -­‐3.5	   106.7	   -­‐2.7	  
	   (0.1)	   (0.2)	   (0.0)	   	  	   	   	  
Italy	   2.1	   1.8	   3.4	   -­‐5.3	   133.5	   -­‐2.1	  
	   (0.1)	   (0.3)	   (0.2)	   	  	   	   	  
Luxembourg	   2.4	   1.9	   1.8	   -­‐2.4	   27.1	   0.5	  
	   (0.3)	   (0.1)	   (0.4)	   	  	   	   	  
Netherlands	   2.1	   1.9	   2.0	   -­‐2.1	   71.2	   -­‐2.2	  
	   (0.2)	   (0.1)	   (0.4)	   	  	   	   	  
Poland	   2.6	   2.5	   4.9	   0.2	   51.7	   -­‐2.6	  
	   (0.4)	   (0.1)	   (0.5)	   	  	   	   	  
Portugal	   1.4	   1.8	   4.5	   -­‐4.3	   127.6	   -­‐2.3	  
	   (0.2)	   (0.2)	   (0.5)	   	  	   	   	  
Slovak	  Republic	   3.5	   2.0	   3.1	   -­‐1.0	   54.8	   -­‐2.2	  
	   (0.5)	   (0.1)	   (0.2)	   	  	   	   	  
Slovenia	   2.2	   1.9	   3.2	   -­‐3.3	   78.9	   -­‐2.4	  
	   (0.4)	   (0.2)	   (0.1)	   	  	   	   	  
Spain	   1.5	   1.8	   3.8	   -­‐4.2	   100.9	   -­‐3.3	  
	   (0.2)	   (0.2)	   (0.5)	   	  	   	   	  
Sweden	   2.8	   1.9	   2.6	   -­‐1.0	   42.9	   -­‐0.6	  
	   (0.2)	   (0.0)	   (0.6)	   	  	   	   	  
Source:	  OECD	  long-­‐term	  projections,	  OECD	  Economic	  Outlook	  No.	  96,	  and	  authors’	  calculations.	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Figure	  A2.1	  Main	   Fiscal	   and	  Macroeconomic	  Variables	   under	  Various	   Scenarios	  Over	  
2017-­‐2026	  
 
(a)	  Change	  in	  the	  Underlying	  Primary	  
Balance	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  Potential	  Output) 
 
(b)	  Change	  in	  Maastricht	  Debt	   	  
(Average,	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  GDP)	  
 
	  
 
(c)	  Average	  Nominal	  GDP	  Growth	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  Average	  Output	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(%	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(e)	  Implicit	  Interest	  Rate	  Paid	  on	  
Government	  Debt	  (%)	  
	    
 
(f)	  Implicit	  Interest	  Rate	  Received	  on	  
Government	  Assets	  (%)	  
 
Source:	  OECD	  Economic	  Outlook	  No.	  96	  database	  and	  authors’	  calculations.	  
 
